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NOTES
EVIDENcE-DECLARATIONS AS TO DOMICILE-In

Holyoke v. Hol-

yoke's Estate,' the Supreme Court of Maine held, inter alia, that the
declarations of the testator, disclosing an intention to change his
domicile, are admissible in proceedings for the probate of his will
only when the declarations have accompanied the acts which they
explain.
It is well settled that the acquisition of a domicile in a given
place depends upon two essential factors; the actual personal presence in the jurisdiction in question and the concurrent intention
to make it his domicile. 2 Accordingly, the domicile of origin, or the
prior domicile, is presumed to continue until another sole domicile
Since one of the elements in determining a
has been acquired.'
change of domicile is a condition of mind, the "'intention" of the
person to make the given jurisdiction his permanent domicile,' the

187 Atl. Rep. 40 "(Me.1913).
'Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa. 2o1 (1874).
"Mather v. Cunningham, 105 Me. 36 (i909); Leach v. Pillsbury, 15
N. H. 137 (x&4).
' Supra.
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question arises as to the admis-ibility of his declarations in proof of
such ilntention.' It is only natural that his declarations, oral and
written, should be frequently resorted to in discovering his state of
mind, his mental attitude, when he moved to the jurisdiction.
The courts differ in their rules governing the admission- of
such declarations. The early Massachusetts cases - laid down the
principle that declarations of intention to make the state in question his domicile are admissible only when the) accompany, qualify,
or explain acts relevant to the issue of domicile. This rule limited
the declarations to those made as part of the res gestae, in accordance with the Verbal Act doctrine.' Maine has always adhered to
this doctrine.'
Massachusetts has, however, changed its attitude on this question;s and its courts now admit declarations whether the), accompany relevant acts or not. In I'ilcs v. IValtham," the court said:
'The intention of the party removing is competent to be proved as
an independent fact, and anything which tends to show his intention in making the change may be shown, if it i; free from objection on other particulars . ... Declarations which indicate the
state of mind of the declarant naturally have a legitimate tendency
to show the intention." This case, overthrowing the earlier doctrine in Massachusetts, has been followed in many jurisdictions.",
Even under this broader and more liberal rule the declarations
must appear to have been made under natural circumstances and
without apparent motive to deceive.

Self-serving declarations and

those made after the controversy has arisen are therefore excluded
in all jurisdictions."
N. L S. G.
INCAPACITY OF
P.ARTxERS1I" - DISSOLUTIO X -PERM.NEXT
PARTNER-In Barclay v. Barrie,' the court affinned a decree of dissolution against a copartnership not at will, before the !xpiration
'Thorndike v.Boston, iMetc. tp (.Mass. 184o); Kilburn v.Bennett, 3
Mete. gg (1841); Cole v.Cheshire, i Gray. 444 (184).

43 Wigmore on Evidence, J§1727, 1784.
'Richmond r. Thomaston, 28 Me. 234 (1854); Belmont v.Vinalhaven,
82 Me. 524 (189o); Holyoke v. Holyoke's Estate, supra. In Illinois, Kreitz
v. Behrensmeyer, i25 11. 141 (i888). follows the liberal rule, while Matzenbaugh v.People, 194 Ill. io8 (9o2), appears to uphold the narrow doctrine
of the early Massachusetts cases.
'Viles t. Waltham, x57 Mass. 502 893).
"157 Mass. 542 (i893).
"Bigelow v.Bear, 64 Kan. 887 (19oo); Baker v.Kelly, 41 Miss. 696
(1868); Chase v.Chase, 66 N. H. .S8 (i891) ; Chambers v.Prince. 7s Fed.
176 (1891); itre, Robert's Will, 8 Paige, 51g (N. Y. i84o).
Watson v.Simpson. 8 La. Amn. 337 (1853) ; Cherry v.Slade, 2 Hawks,
4oo (Eng. 1823).
I1o2 N. E. Rep. 6u2 (N. Y. 1913).
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of the term, at the instance of the partner continuing the business
against a partner who had become incapacitated through paralysis
subsequent to the formation of the agreement; upon the basis that
every partner, independent of express provision, impliedly undertakes to advance the success of the copartnership by devoting to it
within reasonable limits his time, efforts and ability. His copartners are entitled to this contribution and, if for any reason, he
fails to fulfill his duties, they are thereby deprived of the benefits
of the contract and the fruits of their joint enterprise, and equity
has jurisdiction to afford the injured parties inmnediate relief from
2
a situation surrounded with such serious responsibilities.
13y unanimous authority the elements requisite to obtain dissolution of a copartnership for a defined term, or rather of a partnership not at will, are: (a) complete incapacity; 3 (b) of a durable
or probably permanent form, as opposed to fleeting, or temporary
disabilities;' (c) relievable only in equity by decree for dissolution; ' (d) subject under that flexible jurisdiction to a close scrutiny
of the attending circumstances-the relief afforded to be governed
thereby.
Although insanity affords the most frequent illustration of the
application of this principle, the relief is not confined to such cases,
and the court may, as in the principal case, dissolve a partnership
when a partner becomes in any way permanently incapable of performing his part of the copartnership contract.
\Vith regard to who may obtain such relief Lindley says:
"If the permanent incapacity arises from a cause other than unsoundness of mind, the court will not grant a dissolution at "the instance
of the person incapacitated, but the action must be brought by one
of the other partners." It is submitted that this statement, while
acquiesced in by a, few writers and cases, is too broad, being rather
by way of dictum and unsupported by precise authorities, except
as applied to two other classes of cases where equity will decree
a dissolution, viz.: (a) where the offending partner has been guilty
99 (Eng. 1813) ; Sayer v. Bennett, i Cox,
2Water v. Taylor. 2 V. & B. -107 (Eng. 1784): Anon., 2 K. & J. 441 (Eng. 1856) ; Casky v. Casky. 5 Ky. Law
R. 775 (1884) ; Griswold v. Waddington, iS Johns. 57 (N. Y. 1818) ; Story on
Partnership (2th ed.), §297: Gow on Partnership (Amer. ed.), --68-270.
'Jones v. Noy, .2 My. & K. 125 (Eng. 1833) ; Griswold v. Waddington.
supra; Raymond v. Vaughn. t28 111.256 (z889), 4 L. R. A. 44o; Besch v.
Frolic, i Ph. Ch. 172 (Eng. 1842); Story (7th ed.), §§-96-297.
"Sadler v. Lee, 6 Beav. 323 (Eng. 1843); Leaf v. Coles, i De G. M.
& G. 417 (Eng. 1851); Story, §-97; Lindley on Partnership (8th ed., 1912),
pp. 64o. 654.
'See cases cted 11. 2, supra; Raymond v. Vaughn, supra, n. 3; Whitwell
v. Arthur, 35 Beav. 142 (Eng. 1865).
'Henn v. Walsh, 2 Edw. Ch. 129 (N. Y. 1833); Whitwell v. Arthur,
supra, n. 5.
'Leaf v. Coles, supra, n. 4; Jones v. Lloyd, L. R. (18 Eq.). 265, 274
(Eng. 1874).
' Partnership (8th ed.), 654.
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of conduct prejudicial to the business; or (b) otherwise conducts
himself so that it is not reasonably practicable for the others to carry
on the business with him.' In these latter instances, Obviously, dissolution at the instance of the partner in default would be inequitable.
But, it is submitted by all the analogies and equities applicable to
dissolution in cases of mental incapacity,10 there is no basic principle for refusing like relief at the instance of one in contractual
default through unavoidable physical incapacity, as in the principal
case.

That valid dissolution in cases of complete incapacity of any
nature may be had in no way other than by decree in equity has
never been doubted in England since Lord Kenyon's ruling in
Sayer v. Benectt.1 Parsons, in his work on Partnership,= while
recognizing the existence of the English rule, strongly advocated
that "insanity, certain, complete and hopeless of itself and at once
dissolves the partnership." But he is supported by only two cases,"
apparently briefly considered; the more prevalent ruling being in
accord with that of the English courts. 1'
J.C.A.
SPEMnIC PERFORMANCE-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-Whether-mis-

take is a ground for depriving the defendant of the protection of
the Statute of Frauds in a bill for specific performance. is a much
vexed question, and one on which there is more conflict than harmony of opinion. In IVirtz v. Guthric,' the defense to a bill for
specific performance of an agreement for the sale of land, was that
the gross rent of the premises was not what the defendant had been
lead to believe. The plaintiff then offered to prove by oral testi• Lindley: Partnership, 64o, 655-6A
"The insane partner has the right to come into equity by committee to
have the partnership dissolved upon the grounds, (a) of complete incapacity
to perform his agreement, Jones v. Noy, supra, n. 3; and (b) as ruled in
Jones v. Lloyd, supra, n. 7, "By the act of God that bargain (contract of
copartnership) has become incapable of performance, and he is not able to
exercise that supervision over the conduct of the business and care of the
property" . . . necessary to protect his interest.
It is suggested that these reasons apply with equal force to cases of
complete incapacity through physical disability. Furthermore the objection
that the physically incapacitated partner remains sui juris, as contrasted with
one mentally incapacitated, and therefore has means to protect himself at
law, is of no great weight and is not insurmountable in equity, when it is
observed that a lunatic also may sue at law by committee and has, nevertheless, relief in chancery.
' I Cox 107 (Eng. 1784).
" Parsons: Partnership (st ed.), 465.
'Davis v. Lane, io R H. z, x6r (t839) ; Isler v. Baker, 6 Humph. 85
(Tenn. r845).
" Raymond v. Vaughn, supra, Ui.3; Casky v. Casky, supra, n. 2; Story
(Oth ed.), §6-298; -Henn v. Walsh, 2 Edw. Ch. 129 (N. Y. 1833).
187 At& Rep. x34 (N. J. 1913).
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mony that one lot had been omitted by mistake from the agreement
and asked that the contract be reformed to include this lot and
then enforced. To this the defendant set up the Statute of Frauds.
The court held that though in the case of an executed contract the
party who had received the benefit of the mistake would be prevented in equity from holding it; yet in mere executory agreements
which do not disturb the legal title, the statute would not be broken
in upon.
The English Chancery Courts lay down the doctrine that, irrespective of the Statute, the plaintiff may not introduce parol evidence
for the purpose of reforming the written contract and then haye
it enforced.- In this country a more lenient rule prevails and a
great number of courts have granted reformation and enforcement.
In support of this ductrine Chancellor Kent said: ' "Why should not
the party aggrieved by mistake have relief as well when he is plaintiff as well as when he is defendant? It cannot make any difference in the reasonableness and justice of the remedy, whether the
mistake were to prejudice one party or the other." But in the
American jurisdictions, where the statute requires the contract to
be in writing, a distinct conflict exists. In these contracts all possible errors requiring verbal variation may be reduced to two general groups: (a) by means of the error the contract may include
certain subject matter which was not intended by the parties to
come within its operation; (6) the contract may omit, through
error, certain subject matter which was intended to come within its
operation.
A reformation and enforcement based upon parol evidence in
the first groups of cases does not conflict with the statute, since the
court does not make a parol contract but simply narrows the operation of one already made. In the second group, it is asserted that
by reformation the contract is made to include subject matter not
in the original agreement, and the court has virtually made a new
contract and enforced it in direct conflict with the statute.5 The
courts adopting this view, limit their relief to cases in the first group.
By carrying this doctrine to its logical conclusion it would seem that
luity must always make way for the statute, thereby preventing the
e-tablishinent and enforcement of parol contracts which the defendant's actual fraud had prevented from being reduced to writing.
Other courts, however, make no distinction between the two groups
and grant relief in both.' The latter view is favored by Pomeroy, who
-Townshend v. Stangroom, 6 Ves. Jun. 728 (i8oi). Woolham v. Hearn,
7 Ves. Jun. 211 (1802).
SKeisselbrack v. Livingston. 4 Johns. Ch. 144 (N. Y. 1819). Gillespie v.
'Moon. 2 Johns. Ch. 585 (N. Y. 1817). Smith v. Allen, z N. J. Fq. 43 (1830).
ltendrickson v. lvins, I N. J. Eq. 562 (1832).
. Keisselbrack v. Livingston, supra, n. 3.
'Glass v. Hurlbert. 1o2 .Mass. 24 (1869). Elder v. Elder, io 'Me. go
(1833).
'Note 3, sutpra.
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claims it is supported by the great- weight of authority.' And in
following it out he argues that if the rule applies to deeds which
have actually conveyed title, then a fortiori it may be applied to
mere executory contracts. But the cases to which he refers seem to
be those of executed agreements. ,Moreover there are both decisions $ and statements by wriiters," that no court has ever reformed an executory contract on parol evidence and specifically
enforced it with the variations.
It is interesting to note the dictun of Lord Hardwicke to the
effect that the plaintiff in a bill for specific performance might have
to the court, "bebeen allowed the benefit of disclosing a mistake
cause it was an executory agreement only;"10
T.S.P.

TRADE-NAMES-UNFAIR

COMPETITIONM-In

Briggs Co. v.

National Wafer Co.,' the court applies the rule that the user of a
trade-name which has acquired a secondary meaning, is entitled to
injunctive protectiun against the piracy of that name by competitors; but the protection granted will be only co-extensive with the
area in which that secondary meaning has been recognized by the
ultimate purchasers of the class of goods in question. This isthe
logical result of the present development of the'law of unfair competition. There can be no unfair trade unless there be competition.2 The gist of the action is passing off the goods of one manufacturer or dealer as the goods of another, i. e., of trading upon
the reputation of a competitor.8
Although it is agreed that a trade-mark is a species of property," it is by no means settled whether a trade-name is likewise
to be regarded as property.5 A trade-name which is geographical,
'Por. Eq. Juris., §866.
'Macomber v. Peckham, 16 R. 1.485 (1889). Safe Deposit Co. v. Diamond
C. & C. Co., 83 Ad. Rep. s4 (Pa. 1912).
'Adams Eq. ($th Am. ed.) 171.
"Joynes v. Statham, 3 Atk. 388 (Eng. 1746).
3io2 N. E. Rep. 87 (Mass. 1913). As to contemporaneous use of trademarks in different localities, see 58 Univ. of Pa. Law Rev. 115 (igog).
I Sartor v. Schaden, 125 Iowa, 696 (i9o4); Eastern Outfitting Co. v.
Manheim, 59 Wash. 428 (19zo).
'Ford v. Foster, L R. 7 Ch. 611, 623 (1872); Singer Mfgers. v. Wilson,
3 A. C 376 (1877); Glove Co. v. Rubber Co., x28 U. S. 598 (1888); N. E.
Awl'& N. Co. v. Needle Co, t68 Mae ss. i54, 155 (1897); Regis v. Jaynes, 185
Mass. 458, 462 (19o4) ; Fox Co. v. Glynn, igi Mass. 344. 349 (9b6) ; Reading
Stove Works v. Howes, 2oi Mass. 437 (i9o9).

'57 U. of Pa. Law Rev.

251 (19O9).

' Lord Herschell in Reddaway v. Banham (1896). A. C. 199, 2c9; and
Holmes, J., in Chadwick v. Cowell. 151 Mass. i9o, 194 (89), refuse to
contra, Lord Westbury in
recognize any right of property in a trade-name;
)
Wotherspoon v. Currie, L R. _ H. L. 5o8 (1872 ; Munger, J., in Wolf Bros.
v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., !65 Fed. 413 (1908); Day, J., in Am. Wash-
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generic, or descriptive cannot constitute a valid trade-niark. 6 But if
a trade-name has been used so long by one to indicate and to distinguish his particular goods or business, and has conie to signify

in the minds of the ultimate purchasers or parties the goods or
business of him, it is said to have acquired a secondary meaning.'

No fixed, definite period of time is required; it is purely a question
of fact in each instance. Do prospective purchasers when asking
for "Boston Wafers," as in the principal case, desire wafers of the
plaintiff's manufacture? Or do they merely desire any wafers,
actually or supposedly, made in Boston?

If the former be true,

the trade-name "Boston Wafers" has acquired a secondary meaning among these purchasers; if the latter be true, it has not acquired
a secondary meaning, but is used in its simple, primary sense.
A tradesman whose trade-name has established a secondary

meaning is protected by equity in the sole use of that name.' The
fundamental test in each instance is whether the purchasing public
is liable to be misled into buying the defendant s goods, thinking

that it is getting the plaintiff's.' The "ordinary purchaser" or "ultiboard Co. Y. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 1o3 Fed. 281 (igoo), and Braley, J., in Regis
v. Jaynes, 185 Mass. 458 (1904). It is submitted that Lord Hersehell and
Holmes, J., are correct; those contra seem to have confused trade-names
with trade-marks. Cf. Friedman v. Hollander Co., 238 Pa. 397 (1913), as to
confusion between trade-names and trade-marks.
'Canal Co. v. Clark, i3 Wall. 311 (U. S. 1872); Shaver v. Heller, i8
Fed. 821 (191o); Cohen v. Nagle, i9o Mass. 4 (19o6); 57 U. of Pa. Law Rev.
272 (io0).

'Lee v. Haley, L. R. 5 Ch. 155 (1869); Wotherspoon v. Currie, L R. 5
H. L. 5o8 (1872); Montgomery v. Thompson (i8gi), A. C. 217; Reddaway v.
Banham, supra; Birmingham Vinegar Co. v. Powell, L R. (1897) A. C. 710;
Elgin W -h Co. v. Ill. Watch Case Co., 179 U. S. 665 (I9OO) ;French Republic
v. Saratoga Vichy Co., 191 U. S. 427 (19o3) ; Herring Safe Co. v. Hall's Safe
Co., 2o8 U. S. 554 (1907); Bissell Plow Works v. Bissell Plow Co., 121 Fed.
357 (19o2) ; Ball v. Best, 135 Fed. 434 (x9o5) ; Wolf Bros. v. Hamilton-Brown
Shoe Co., supra; Merriam v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369 (1g2) ; Lynn Shoe Co. v.
Auburn Lynn Shoe Co., ioo Me. 461 (T9o5); Viano v. Baccigalupo, 183 Mass.
i6o (1902) ; Cohen v. Nagle, supra; Suburban Press v. Suburban Pub. Co.,
227 Pa. 148 (1910).
* If a surname has been used as the trade-name of a business or of an
article of merchandise, and has, as such, acquired a secondary meaning, a
person of that name will be restrained from using it in his own business, subsequently established, if any fraudulent intent or inala fides on his part can be
shown. Fine Cotton Spinners v. Harwood Co. (1907), Ch. 184; International
Silver Co. v. Rogers, 72 N. J. Eq. 933 (1907); 53 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 585'
(19o5) ; s5 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 5x8 (i9o7). Similarly Brown, J., in a dictum
in French Rep. v. Vichy Co., i9i U. S. 427 (19o3), held that. in the absence
of actual fraudulent intent, an inhabitant of a place, the name of which has
been previously used as a part of a trade-name and has as such acquired a
secondary meaning. may use such geographical name in his own business
conducted within those geographical limits.
' Reddaway v. Banham, suprua; Holeproof Hosiery Co. v. Wallack Bros.,
ico Fed. 6o6 (i91) ; Notasema Hosiery Co. v. Straus. 201 Fed. 99 (1912) ;
.Ain. Waltham Watch Co. v. U. S. Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85 (899); Richard
v. Caton College, 92 N. W. Rep. 958 (Minn. 19o3); Centaur Co. v. Link,
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mate consuner," and not the middle man, is to be regarded as the
purchasing public; 10 and the class of persons who constitute the
purchasers of the particular article must be taken into account."
Furthermore, actual deception need not be shown; 12 the liability of
the ordinary purchaser of the goods to take the defendant's for
the plaintiff's is sufficient.13 And in applying the test the fact that
the defendant's intent was bona fide or fraudulent is entirely immaterial.4 Nor is it material that the purchasers who use the name
in its secondary sense, do not in fact know the plaintiff's name; 15 or
that the defendant's goods are in reality superior to the plaintiff's; 16
or that the purchasers are indifferent whether they get the plaintiff's
or the defendant's goods.'7 But before any question can properly
arise, there must be competition. The conflicting trade-names must
be applied to goods of the same class, although not necessarily of
the same species.' 8 Equity will not relieve against competition that
is not -unfair; on the contrary it will encourage legitimate trade
rivalry.' 0 In most instances the trade is greater in territorial extension than the recognition of the trade-name's secondary meaning,
and beyond the latter limits such tradesman has no ground for complaint. His trade-name, if used at all, must necessarily be used in
its primary sense, and any competitor who can otherwise lawfully
employ his trade-name, has as much right to do so as lie himself
62 N. J.Eq. 147 (19oi); Busch v. Gross, 7z N. J.Eq. 5o8 (19o5); Higgins v.
Higgins, j44 N. Y. 462 (1895); Juigens Co. v. Woodbury, io6 N. Y. Supp.
571 (1goy) ; Eastern Outfitting Co. v. Manheim, 59 Wash. 428 (igio).
" Edge v. Nicolls, L. R. (igii) A. C. 693; Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v.
Alder. 154 Fed. 37 (i9o7); Forster Mfg. Co. v. Cutter-Tower Co., 211 Mass.
219 (1911).

"1Edge v. Nicolls, supra; Mlellwood Distillery Co. v. Harper, z67 Fed. 389
(i9o8); Legal Aid Soc. v. Co-operative Legal Aid Soc., 33 N. Y. Supp. 9-26
(19o3).
" Notaseme Hosiery Co. v. Straus, supra; Reading Stove Works v. Howes,
supra; Forster Mfg. Co. v. Cutter-Tower Co., supra; Parsons v. Gillespie
(z898), A. C. 239, seems to require plaintiff to show the actual deception of
the public.
"'Johnson v. Ewing, L. R. 7 A. C. 219 (i882); Dutton v. Cuffles, 117
N. Y. 172 (9o7).
.North Cheshire Brew. Co. v. Manchester Brew. Co., L R. (i899) A. C.
83; Saxlehner v. Eisner & At. Co., 179 U. S.i9 (igoo); Alantitowac Packing
Co. v. Numser, 93 Fed. z96 (1899); Van Hoboken v. Mohrs, 112 Fed. 528
(i9o); Dymert v. Lewis, j44 Iowa, 5og (i909); N. XV. Knitting Co. v.
Garon, 112 Minn. 322 (igio) ; Portuondo Cigar Co. v. Cigar Co., 222 Pa. j16
(1908).
" Birmingham Vinegar Co. v. Powell, L R. (1897)

A. C. 7io; Edge v.

Nicolls, supra.
Reading Stove Works v. Howes, supra.
Reading Stove Works v. Howes, supra.
"Atlas Mlfg. Co. v. Street. 204 Fed. 398 (1x3); X. W. Knitting Co. v.
Garon. supra; Richardson v. Richardson, 8 N. Y. Supp. 52 (1889).
"Ilagg .Mfg. Co. v.Holway. 178 Mass. 83 (igox).
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has.2" In the absence of validity as a trade-mark and of a secondary
meaning, a tradesman, as to htis trade-name, has no rights which
others are bound to respect or the courts to enforce.2 1
P.IN. S.
Lzt;.%t. Ei-litcs-The following questions were recently anbwered
by the New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on Legal
Ethics:
QLESTIO.V:
Is it a breach of profesbional cthicb for a lawycr-whn lknuwingly p rmits

it-to allow his client, whom he represents, to act as a "dummy" in a trans-

action. i. c.. the making of a loan on bond and mortgage; in other words, when
the application for the loan is made. the property to be mortgaged stands in
the name of A & B, and, when the loan is closed, the mortgage is given to Cto whom, in the meantime. the property was transferred-and two days after
the recording of tile mortgage the property is transferred by C to A & B
(the former owners), who thereby escape liability. although the loan was in
fact made to A & B, and presumably, C, was financially irresponsible?
ANSWER:
In the opinion of the Committee: As the question does not import that
there is any deception or misrepresentation or any imposition upon any one,
or that the contract is in any way unlawful, and parties are at liberty to
make lawiul contracts upon such terms and with such persons and upon such
security as may be agreed. the Committee is of the opinion that the question
disclosed no breach of any lawyer's duty; the lawyer should, however, explain
to his client, "the dummy," the liability which he incurs.
QUESTIONV:

Do you deem it improper professional conduct for a lawyer to advertise
for bnsiniess in the following form? You will note that he does not mention
his profession.
-1 act as adviser, arbitrator, adjudicator and special confidential
agent to diplomatically adjust all difficulties and disputes for individuals, corporations or heirs. Bond given when matters of trust are
placed with me. Bank references ...................................
Appointment by 'phone: .....................
.....................

A.NswEst:
In the opinion of the Committee, the advertisement referred to is improper, notwithstanding its opening words "Avoid litigation."
" Inve:,tor Pub. Co. v. Dobison, 82 Fed. 56 (1897); Hainque v. Cyclops
Iron Works. T36 Cal. 351 (1go92); Cohen v. Nagle. 1go Mass. 4 (19o6);
v. Broadway Bazaar. 121 N. Y.
Miskell V. Prokop. :6 Neb. 628 (1899) ; Ball
.
App. 1,46 (19o;); Bingbam School v. Gray x-, X. C. 699, 7o7 (1898).
'Cellular Clothing Co. v. Maxton (ig9) A. C. 326- 342; Carroll v.
.McIlvaine, 183 Fed. 22 (t9to); Sartor v. Schaden. 125 Iowa, 696 (1904);
Corwin v. Daly. 7 Brew. (N. Y.) 222. 235 (iS6o; Eastern Outfitting Co. v.
Manheim, .supra.
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QESTION :

A gave 'Mrs. C an option on a piece of property. She threatened suit for
the return of the option money. A called on his attorney, stated the facts to
him, asking him to defend him in the suit should one be brought. The lawyer
agreed to do this. No payment was made for retainer, and none asked,.as
A was absolutely responsible financially, and had had business relations with
this attorney before, under similar circumstances.
Subsequent to this. Mrs. C saw the junior partner of this law firn who
commenced suit against A. A called on the junior partner and protested
against his taking the case against him. The junior partner pleaded justification by saying that when he commenced suit he was ignorant of any
arrangement between A and his partner, and further that there was no payment for retainer.
First: Was the junior partner justified in taking the case against A?
Second: Could he withdraw from the suit and in case the suit went on.
-ould the .-cvior partner defend A. as per original agreement between himself

and A?

Asswa:
In the opinion of the Committee, that if in ignorance of A's relationship
with the senior member, the junior member took Mrs. Cs case. there was

rothing in his conduct justifying criticism: but upom discovery of the fact,
each partv Ras disqualified from acting for either of the parties in the
controversy.

